New York City Headed for Rolling Hochul Blackouts

Roger Caiazza (on the subject of)
Independent Researcher and Publisher,
Pragmatic Environmentalist of New York

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[Editor’s Note: Roger explains why New York City is headed for rolling Hochul blackouts in an abbreviated version of an article posted in full on his own outstanding blog.]

On July 14, 2023 the New York Independent System Operator (NYISO) released its quarterly assessment of reliability of the bulk electric system.  The analysis found a deficit in reliability margins for the New York City area beginning in summer 2025. As a result, something must be done or there will be unacceptable risks to reliability that could cause power outages.  Unfortunately, it is difficult to understand the reasons for this finding because of the complexity of the subject.  This post includes a detailed explanation of the report and its implications.  If you want a good non-technical summary, then I recommend James Hanley’s post Get Ready for the New York City Blackout of 2025.

The analysis finds that there are issues associated with peaking power plants in New York City.  I have been involved with this problem and these facilities since 2000.  This topic has been the subject of multiple articles on this blog and I have summarized my articles as on overview that I can reference when the issue resurfaces.  The Executive Summary notes:

This assessment finds a reliability need beginning in summer 2025 within New York City primarily driven by a combination of forecasted increases in peak demand and the assumed unavailability of certain generation in New York City affected by the “Peaker Rule.”  In 2019, the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation adopted a regulation to limit nitrogen oxides (NOx) emissions from simple-cycle combustion turbines, referred to as the “Peaker Rule” (https://www.dec.ny.gov/regulations/116131.html)

The Peaker Rule culminated a decade-long process whereby the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) instituted a framework to retire or control the “peakers”.  The DEC, NYISO, facility owners and Consolidate Edison, the load serving entity for New York City, all worked together to ensure that the retirement would not endanger reliability.  This latest analysis suggests that there are still issues to be resolved:

Combustion turbines known as “peakers” typically operate to maintain bulk power system reliability during the most stressful operating conditions, such as periods of peak electricity demand. As of May 1, 2023, 1,027 MW of affected peakers have deactivated or limited their operation. An additional 590 MW of peakers are expected to become unavailable beginning May 1, 2025, all of which are in New York City.   With the additional peakers unavailable, the bulk power transmission system will not be able to securely and reliably serve the forecasted demand in New York City (Zone J). Specifically, the New York City zone is deficient by as much as 446 MW for a duration of nine hours on the peak day during expected weather conditions when accounting for forecasted economic growth and policy-driven increases in demand.

The following paragraph explains that the reliability need is expected because the latest projections of generation, load, and transmission availability have changed over time:

The reliability need is based on a deficient transmission security margin that accounts for expected generator availability, transmission limitations, and updated demand forecasts using data published in the 2023 Load & Capacity Data Report (“Gold Book”). The transmission security margin represents the balance between demand for electricity and the power supply available from generation and transmission to serve that demand. This assessment recognizes that there is uncertainty in the demand forecast due to uncertainties in key assumptions including population and economic growth, the proliferation of energy efficiency, the installation of behind-the-meter renewable energy resources, and electric vehicle adoption and charging patterns. These risks are accounted for in the transmission security margin calculations by incorporating the lower and higher bounds as a range of forecasted conditions during expected weather, specified in the Gold Book as the policy scenario forecasts. The lower and higher demand policy scenario forecasts reflect achievement of policy targets through alternative pathways and assume the same weather factors as the baseline demand forecast.

The Gold Book is the standard for electric data in New York. The following figure shows the range of the demand forecasts for New York City.  I want to point out one thing.  The emphasis is on providing generation for the peak load.  This is a significantly more difficult problem than estimating the generation necessary for an average year.

I have some experience with the resource modeling projections and cannot over-emphasize the complexity of all the factors incorporated in the models.  Unfortunately, there is a lot of uncertainty associated with projecting all those factors.  That is why the NYISO is constantly re-evaluating the model inputs and projections.  In addition, they are always looking to refine the model itself.  Based on their latest estimates:

Under the baseline forecast for coincident summer peak demand, the New York City transmission security margin would be deficient by 306 MW in 2025 for a duration of 7 hours. However, accounting for uncertainties in key demand forecast assumptions, the higher bound of expected demand under baseline weather conditions (95 degrees Fahrenheit) in 2025 results in a deficiency of 446 MW over 9 hours. The deficiency would be significantly greater if New York City experiences a heatwave (98 degrees Fahrenheit) or an extreme heatwave (102 degrees Fahrenheit).

The NYISO is banking on one project to address this problem after 2025.

Overall, the New York City transmission security margin is expected to improve in 2026 if the Champlain Hudson Power Express (CHPE) connection from Hydro Quebec to New York City enters service on schedule in spring 2026, but the margin gradually erodes through time thereafter as expected demand for electricity grows. Beyond 2025, the forecasted reliability margins within New York City may not be sufficient if (i) the CHPE project experiences a significant delay, (ii) additional power plants become unavailable, or (iii) demand significantly exceeds current forecasts. Without the CHPE project in service or other offsetting changes or solutions, the reliability margins continue to be deficient for the ten-year planning horizon. In addition, while CHPE is expected to contribute to reliability in the summer, the facility is not expected to provide any capacity in the winter.

I am uncomfortable that there is this much reliance on a single project to address the problems identified.  I discussed the start of construction late last year for the Champlain Hudson Power Express (CHPE) project.  It is a 339-mile underground transmission line capable of bringing 1,250 MW from the Province of Quebec to Astoria Queens in New York City.  I explained that I was worried about the schedule and costs of the project.  The NYISO Resource Adequacy analyses must necessarily rely on the developer’s prediction for completion.

Richard Ellenbogen and I share the timeliness concern.  Richard noted that the project was proposed in 2011 and the PSC authorized it on 4/18/13.  It has been 11.5 years since it was proposed, 9.5 years since it was authorized, and construction started a year after the funding contract was signed.  In addition, it has recently come out that landowners on sections of the right-of-way that are on land have just been informed that they will be impacted.  The likelihood of additional delays seems high.

Given that other renewable projects are being re-evaluated because of price increases due to inflation and increased cost of materials it seems that this project will also have the same problems.  Given its importance to New York City reliability, I cannot conceive of any scenario in which the State will not grant any cost overruns requested by the developers. This project is already expensive equating to an estimated increase in customer electric bills of 2.1 – 4.1% (or $2.08 – $4.08 per month for the average residential customer.  I am confident that at the end of the day the final costs will be much higher.

The report also describes an upcoming issue that will be considered officially in a subsequent report. The “informational scenario” considers interconnecting large loads:  the Micron New York semiconductor manufacturing (530 MW in 2030), the Air Products and Chemicals (Q#1446), and other load changes that increase load another 694 MW.

As an informational scenario, this STAR includes an evaluation of the impact of additional large load interconnection projects primarily in western and central New York. The anticipated increases to the demand forecast due to these large loads in 2025 is 764 MW which results in a corresponding reduction to the available margin, such that in 2025 the statewide system margin is projected to be deficient of 145MW. By 2033, additional large loads increase the demand by 1,224 MW which results in a corresponding deficient margin of 104 MW. If CHPE does not begin operation, the state wide system margin is projected to be deficient for all years 2025 through 2033 when considering the additional large loads. The 2023 Quarter 3 STAR will include these load projects and the associated system margin impacts. The solution to the New York City reliability need identified in this STAR may also address the state wide system margin concern.

Note there are three ways the problem identified can be resolved: building new capacity resources, construction of additional transmission facilities, and/or reducing load expectations with increased energy efficiency and integration of demand-side resources.  Even if the Hochul Administration came to its senses and decided to facilitate the construction of dependable generating capacity, that is to say, fossil-fired generators, there is no way that any generating resource to support reliability could get built in this timeframe.

My rule of thumb for just getting permits in New York City is a minimum of three years.  The summer of 2025 is only two years away.  Of course, the possibility of any new fossil infrastructure is very unlikely anyway.  Designing, permitting, and building additional transmission facilities may not take quite as long but I cannot imagine this solution could be available in two years.  There already are great expectations for reducing load so I cannot imagine any scenario that could reduce additional load on the order necessary to meet the identified load shortfall.

Discussion

The Findings section expands the description of the problem found.  Without changes to existing load pattern the summer peak load demand in New York City would be “deficient by 306 MW in 2025 for a duration of 7 hours.”  If the deficiency is “significantly greater” then it will be impossible to manage the load without rolling blackouts.

The NYISO writes: “The deficient margin is primarily due to the increased demand forecasts within New York City combined with the planned unavailability of simple-cycle combustion turbines to comply with the DEC’s Peaker Rule in 2025”.   Apparently, it is not politically correct to point out that Hochul Administration’s policy that finalized the shutdown of 2,000 MW of nuclear power and the disapproval of a plan to build a 1,040 MW, eventually reduced to 437 MW, combined cycle facility exacerbated this problem and that if those resources were available there would not be a problem.

As it stands now, I expect that the solution will be an extension of the operating permits for the peaking turbines because there is no other viable solution to maintain reliability.

Reaction

Utility Dive described the report.  Their article quotes Zach Smith, vice president of system and resource planning for the NYISO as saying the assessment “reflects the extraordinary challenges of the grid in transition.”  It also notes that the report acknowledges “uncertainty” in the demand forecast surrounding assumptions including population and economic growth, the proliferation of energy efficiency, the installation of behind-the-meter renewable energy resources, and EV adoption and charging patterns.

The reaction of parties in New York State was predictable.  Marie French writing at Politico solicited comments from the Hochul Administration:

“To be clear: The reliability of our grid is not in question,” Hochul spokesperson Katy Zielinski said in a statement. “We are committed to ensuring New Yorkers have a reliable and affordable power supply — and we can do this while accomplishing our nation-leading climate goals. Governor Hochul remains fully committed to rapidly decreasing emissions and setting an example for how clean energy and reliability can go hand-in-hand.”

French said that Zielinski cited the planned Canadian hydropower line, the Clean Path line and offshore wind projects as ways to bring more renewables into New York City.   There is a fundamental issue with these projects because they all rely heavily on distant  transmission that is overly vulnerable to outages  One of the New York City blackouts occurred because a transmission line into the city went down and in-city generation could not be brought up fast enough to react to the loss of energy supply.

There are specific reliability rules in place that mandate a minimum capability of in-city generation when storms threaten transmission lines into the City.  I am not sure how this will be addressed in the future.  The Canadian hydropower line may not be affected by storms but still could go down unexpectedly for other reasons.  The Clean Path project is “is comprised of more than 20 renewable energy generation projects and an approximate 175-mile, underground transmission line.  I am guessing that the argument is that an underground line can provide power that is not subject to storm outages so is exempt from the transmission line reliability rule.

However, even if they are much less likely to go out, when they do have problems fixing them is much more difficult.  Counting on offshore wind as a viable replacement in the City is very risky unless it is coupled with sufficient energy storage to cover the energy needs for an entire heat wave because the meteorological conditions that cause extreme heat are associated with high-pressure systems that also have light winds.

James Hanley from the Empire Center summarizes the implications well.  He concludes:

The mistake New York has made is not its goal to eventually reduce NOx emissions but its rush to shut down the peakers — and Indian Point — before developing reliable replacement sources of power. Notably, the Department of Environmental Conservation rejected proposals by NRG Energy to update nearly 1,000 megawatts of electricity production in the city to newer, cleaner-burning, and NOx-standard compliant combined-cycle power plants, claiming that NRG “failed to demonstrate the need or justification for the proposed project.”

This “shutdown first, replace later” model was a major cause of rolling blackouts on the West Coast, but New York authorities didn’t bother to learn from California’s experience. Simple common sense would indicate that the wise approach would be to find assured sources of reliable and dispatchable electricity production before taking critical power plants offline. Sadly, common sense was the first victim of New York energy policy. Even more sadly, it won’t be the last.

Conclusion

Despite assurances from Hochul spokesperson Katy Zielinski, the reliability of the New York City grid is in question. The plans rely on resources that are new to New York and that increases uncertainty.  Presuming that proposed projects will replace operational facilities on the schedule proposed is very risky.

Thanks to Russell Schussler for review and helpful comments.  Any technical errors are mine.

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